ACID RAIN IN EUROPE

In Europe, air pollution from one country crosses borders to kill fish and trees and corrode buildings and monuments in neighboring countries. European governments have responded to this situation by collaborating within the 1979 Geneva Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP), as well as by taking measures within the European Community and at the national level.

Because LRTAP was associated with detente negotiations, all the appropriate states are members and participate actively in its joint research programs, which appear to have helped resolve many scientific disputes. When LRTAP was created, only 2 of its 30 members thought acid rain was a problem. Now they all are in the midst of an ambitious plan to develop strict regulatory protocols to lessen acid rain. If the plan is followed successfully, it will result in one of the world's most innovative institutional responses to international environmental hazards.

The protocols that have been adopted to date, which call for specific reductions of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and volatile organic compounds, have a mixed record of success, however. Few states have adjusted their national policies to respond to the protocols, and there is both nonparticipation and noncompliance on the part of some large polluters. The former Soviet Union and the United Kingdom are likely exceptions, however, because, though they are among the biggest polluters in Europe, they seem to have take pollution abatement measures influenced by the sulfur protocol.

LRTAP's success is a function not of its consensus-building and rule-making activities individually but of the way it has integrated the two functions. LRTAP was initially established as a weak institution oriented toward scientific research because, at the time, governments were reluctant to take action and scientists were uncertain about appropriate response. Governments did not feel threatened by LRTAP, even as its scientific working groups resolved the uncertainties in favor of taking action. Governments now accept the need for action.

If the present protocols are considered only as regulatory rules, they are weak and ineffective. However, they serve a vital role in magnifying pressure on recalcitrant states, in keeping the consensus-building activities high on governments' agendas, and in assisting domestic environmental allies of action. This process can be called "tote-board diplomacy," by which a collective standard (such as a 30-percent reduction in sulfur dioxide emissions) is held up publicly and countries that fail to agree are subject to collective pressure.